Tariffs, trade policy, and MI-4's manufacturing base
Manufacturing employs more residents of Allegan and Van Buren counties than any other sector, which makes tariff policy one of the more concrete ways federal action reaches this district's paychecks. This piece lays out who's actually here and what the 2025–2026 tariffs actually do, including the Supreme Court's February 2026 ruling against the IEEPA tariffs. It covers Huizenga's votes on whether Congress could vote to end the emergencies behind those tariffs, and a 2026 manufacturing-workforce bill he sponsored.
Last reviewed Sept. 25, 2026 · Updated Oct. 31, 2026 · Corrections log
Relevant tests: District Relevance · Congressional Responsibility
Who's actually here
County-level employmentDistrict-wide, manufacturing employs 81,776 MI-4 residents (±5,086), 20.9% of those with jobs, compared with 17.7% statewide and 9.6% nationally (U.S. Census Bureau, ACS 2024 1-year, table DP03). The District Baseline has the full industry breakdown.
Auto parts and medical devices are real parts of this economy too, but they're spread across smaller suppliers and contract manufacturers rather than concentrated in one or two employers the way furniture is around MillerKnoll or consumer health is around Perrigo. That's not a knock on their importance, it's just why they're harder to put a single, sourceable number on. I'm not going to invent a precision this sector doesn't have.
What the tariffs actually do, 2025–2026
Effective policy, not campaign rhetoric| Action | What it does | Status as of Sept. 2026 | Relevance to this district |
|---|---|---|---|
| Section 232 steel & aluminum | 25% steel tariffs have applied since 2018. Proclamations signed Feb. 10, 2025 and effective March 12 ended the country exemptions, including those for Canada and Mexico, and raised the aluminum rate from 10% to 25%. Both rates doubled to 50% effective June 4, 2025. Expanded in August 2025 to cover 407 additional derivative products, including household appliances | In effect; not affected by the Supreme Court's IEEPA ruling | Raises input costs for any manufacturer buying steel or aluminum, which is relevant to furniture frames, auto parts, and appliance components alike |
| Section 232 autos & auto parts | 25% tariff on imported autos (April 2025) and on imported auto parts (May 3, 2025), with parts that qualify under USMCA initially exempted | In effect | Affects the district's auto-parts suppliers both as buyers of imported components and as competitors to imported parts |
| Section 232 furniture & cabinets | 25% tariff on upholstered furniture, kitchen cabinets, and vanities, effective Oct. 14, 2025, with lower caps for the UK, EU, and Japan under trade agreements. Increases scheduled for Jan. 1, 2026 were postponed | In effect | Bears directly on the district's office- and home-furniture industry, including MillerKnoll in Zeeland, both as competitors to imported furniture and as buyers of imported components |
| IEEPA reciprocal tariffs | Announced April 2, 2025 ("Liberation Day"): a 10% baseline on most countries plus higher country-specific rates (as high as 50% as announced, later revised). Canada and Mexico were left out and instead faced separate IEEPA "fentanyl" tariffs, with USMCA-qualifying goods exempt | Struck down. The Supreme Court held on Feb. 20, 2026 that IEEPA doesn't authorize tariffs, invalidating both the reciprocal and fentanyl tariffs | While in effect, they raised costs on imported consumer goods, machinery, and components across the district's supply chains |
| Section 122 temporary tariff | 10% on most imports, imposed Feb. 2026 to replace the IEEPA tariffs; goods already covered by Section 232 exempt | Expired July 24, 2026, at its 150-day statutory limit; Congress didn't extend it | A bridge between the IEEPA tariffs and the Section 301 duties below |
| Section 301 duties on 60 economies | Additional 10% or 12.5% duties from USTR, based on findings that those economies failed to prohibit or enforce bans on forced-labor goods. Canada and Mexico are at 10%, with USMCA duty-free goods exempt; Section 232 goods exempt | In effect since July 24, 2026 | The current broad-based tariff layer on imports into the district's supply chains |
| Section 338 tariffs on Canada | 50% tariffs on about $20 billion a year of Canadian imports, imposed under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to "offset Canadian discrimination" against U.S. dairy, alcoholic beverages, and motor vehicles. The duties fall on lists of Canadian products drawn mostly from other sectors, such as flower bulbs, seeds, honey, plastics, wood, and paper products (Proclamation 11048; Wiley, citing USTR, for the $20 billion). It's the first time that statute has been expressly used. Canada retaliated on Sept. 8, 2026 with tariffs on about US$20 billion of U.S. goods. The same day, the President used Section 338 to ban the import of some of the Canadian products already subject to the July tariffs, recalibrated the July tariffs, and directed USTR and the General Services Administration to remove $50 billion of Canadian-origin products from GSA's Multiple Award Schedules (USTR, Sept. 8, 2026). On Oct. 23, 2026, the President signed Proclamation 11076, effective Oct. 30. It removed 22 product lines from the tariffs, mostly plastic and paper packaging, thin plywood, and packaging and produce-handling machinery, and added about 90, including carpets and rugs, cocoa powder, paints, soaps and lubricants, and wood and paper products. | In effect since Aug. 22, 2026 | Hits Michigan's largest trading partner directly, including motor vehicles, the core of the state's auto supply chain. Canada's retaliation targets steel, dairy, appliances, and agricultural equipment |
The votes on whether Congress could end the tariff emergencies
House Clerk recordThe IEEPA tariffs rested on national-emergency declarations. Under Section 202 of the National Emergencies Act, a member can force an expedited House vote on ending one. Several times in 2025, the House adopted rules that switched that procedure off for the tariff emergencies, and Huizenga voted for each. First was H.Res. 211 (March 11, 2025, 216–214), covering the Canada emergency. Next was H.Res. 313 (April 9, 2025, 216–215), covering the April 2 reciprocal-tariff emergency. H.Res. 354 (April 29, 2025, 216–208) carried a similar provision. Last was H.Res. 707 (Sept. 16, 2025, 213–211), which extended the suspension to March 31, 2026 and added the Brazil emergency. H.Res. 707 was a rule setting terms of debate for several unrelated bills, and the emergency provision was one section of it. Three Republicans voted against it: Thomas Massie, Kevin Kiley, and Victoria Spartz. The day before, Huizenga had also voted to table an attempt to force a vote on the Brazil emergency (Roll 265, 200–198).
In February 2026 the House did vote. On Feb. 10, a rule (H.Res. 1042) that Reason reported would have extended the block to August failed 214–217, with Huizenga voting for it. The next day the House passed H.J.Res. 72, terminating the Canada tariff emergency, 219–211. Six Republicans voted yes, and Huizenga voted no. Nine days later, on Feb. 20, the Supreme Court held that IEEPA doesn't authorize tariffs, a power it said the Constitution gives to Congress. When the replacement Section 122 tariff reached its 150-day limit in July 2026, Congress didn't vote to extend it.
I haven't found a public statement from Huizenga explaining these votes. In May 2018, representing the old MI-2 district, he publicly opposed the first Trump administration's steel and aluminum tariffs on allies. He said imports from those countries "do not pose a security risk to the United States," and that any effort aimed at Chinese steel should target China, "not our economic allies." In my assessment, the 2025–26 procedural votes matter at least as much as any single tariff, because they decided whether the House would vote on the tariffs at all. All of them are listed, with results, in the Voting Record. The Congressional Responsibility piece sets them beside his war-powers and oversight record, under Presidents Biden and Trump alike.
Where the manufacturing record cuts the other way
Legislative recordTariff policy isn't the only way a member can act on a manufacturing district's behalf, and the record here isn't only tariffs. On June 2, 2026, Huizenga introduced the American Manufacturing Revitalization Exchange Program Act of 2026 (H.R. 9097) as lead sponsor. Its cosponsors come from both parties: Reps. Johnny Olszewski (D-Md.), Young Kim (R-Calif.), Glenn Thompson (R-Pa.), and Gus Bilirakis (R-Fla.). The bill is aimed squarely at the manufacturing workforce. According to the bill text, it would create an exchange program run through the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. The program would send American manufacturing workers to allied countries for up to twelve months of hands-on training, with a stipend covering reasonable costs, leading to industry-recognized credentials. Listed sectors include robotics, semiconductors, aerospace, additive manufacturing, shipbuilding, and automotive, the last of which overlaps with the district's auto-parts suppliers. The sponsors' joint announcement describes the target workforce as technicians, machinists, engineers, and production specialists. Those are the kinds of jobs in the county employment figures above.
The limits need saying just as plainly. H.R. 9097 has been referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee and hasn't had a markup or floor vote. It's an international exchange program, not a domestic training grant, so its reach into any specific Allegan or Van Buren employer would depend on how it's implemented. There's no demonstrated district impact yet, and there can't be one until it passes. Still, a bipartisan bill written for the same shop-floor workforce this district depends on belongs in an evaluation of his manufacturing record, next to the tariff vote rather than under it. It's also listed on the Active Representation page.