Canada is Michigan's biggest customer

Part 1: Trade relationships

Canada, Mexico, the EU, tariffs, and USMCA: the countries Michigan sells to, and the policies that set the terms.

The Trade & Manufacturing piece covers the full tariff timeline. For Canada and Mexico, the details matter. The Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs applied to them with no exemption. They were left out of the April 2025 "Liberation Day" reciprocal tariffs. Instead, both faced separate IEEPA "fentanyl" tariffs announced in February 2025, with goods that qualify under USMCA exempted. The EU was subject to the reciprocal tariffs.

On Feb. 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump that IEEPA doesn't authorize tariffs, invalidating both the reciprocal and the fentanyl tariffs. The administration replaced them the same day with a temporary 10% tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. That tariff expired on July 24, 2026, when its 150-day limit ran out and Congress didn't extend it. It was followed by new Section 301 duties on 60 economies. Canada and Mexico are subject to those duties at 10%, again with USMCA-qualifying goods exempt, and so is the EU (secondary source: Global Trade Alert summary of the USTR final action). The Section 232 tariffs weren't affected by the ruling and remain in place.

A new round followed in August 2026. The administration imposed 50% tariffs on about $20 billion a year of Canadian imports under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, in response to what it found was Canadian discrimination against U.S. dairy, alcoholic beverages, and motor vehicles. The tariffs apply to lists of Canadian products drawn mostly from other sectors, such as flower bulbs, seeds, honey, plastics, wood, and paper products. They took effect Aug. 22, and Canada retaliated on Sept. 8, 2026. The same day, the administration banned the import of some of the Canadian products already subject to those tariffs and ordered $50 billion of Canadian-origin products removed from federal purchasing schedules (USTR; details). On Oct. 23, 2026, the President signed Proclamation 11076, effective Oct. 30. It removed 22 product lines from the tariffs, mostly plastic and paper packaging, thin plywood, and packaging and produce-handling machinery, and added about 90, including carpets and rugs, cocoa powder, paints, soaps and lubricants, and wood and paper products.

On the congressional side, Huizenga voted for each 2025 House rule that switched off the expedited procedure for votes on ending the tariff emergencies. The last of these was H.Res. 707 in September 2025. On Feb. 11, 2026, when the House did vote on ending the Canada tariff emergency (H.J.Res. 72), it passed 219–211, and Huizenga voted no. Those are votes about process and presidential authority, not about Canada specifically. They're evaluated on those terms in Congressional Responsibility, and every one is listed in the Voting Record. I haven't found a statement from him explaining them. In 2018 he publicly opposed steel and aluminum tariffs on allies. When the U.S.-Mexico-Canada agreement was announced in October 2018, he said "we are stronger trade partners when we work together."

Part 2: Security alliances

NATO, Ukraine, AUKUS, and defense cooperation: the collective-security side of the relationship, which overlaps with Michigan's trade map but isn't the same thing.

Ukraine isn't a formal treaty ally, but the U.S. and its NATO allies have treated it as a frontline partner against Russian aggression since 2022, which puts these votes in this category. Huizenga's record on it runs both ways:

• Sept. 28, 2023: yes on H.R. 5692, a $300 million Ukraine security-assistance bill (passed 311–117).
• Apr. 20, 2024: no on H.R. 8035, the $60.84 billion Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act (passed 311–112 with support from both parties). He voted yes on the Israel and Indo-Pacific bills in the same package.
• June 4, 2026: no on H.R. 2913, the Ukraine Support Act. The bill revives lend-lease authority, extends security assistance, and sets conditional sanctions on Russia. It passed 226–195 after a discharge petition brought it to the floor.

His public comments have come around the votes rather than on them. In March 2022 he called on U.S. stock exchanges to suspend trading of Russian companies. Two days before the April 2024 vote, he told WSJM radio that splitting the aid into separate bills was "a better strategy," and noted that some of the Ukraine aid would be a loan he believed Ukraine could repay. He explained the 2024 no vote in a statement the day of the vote: "I could not support this legislation because of the overall price tag of $61.7 billion and the fact that it funded programs well beyond just military assistance." He had voted for an amendment by Rep. Kat Cammack (R-Fla.) to limit the bill to military assistance, which failed 154–272 (Roll 149). A Holland Sentinel community columnist wrote in May 2024 that she had asked his office three times to explain the vote and hadn't seen an answer. The statement was posted on his website the day of the vote. The sources reviewed for this page didn't identify an explanation of his 2026 no vote on the Ukraine Support Act (see Public Accountability).

His Strategic Ports Reporting Act (H.R. 1701) passed the House by voice vote on May 22, 2025, and its text became law as section 1704 of the FY2026 defense authorization (P.L. 119-60, signed Dec. 18, 2025). It requires the State and Defense departments to map ports of strategic importance and report on Chinese efforts to build, buy, or control them. The same law, section 1248, makes allies' progress toward the NATO commitment of 3.5% of GDP on core defense and 1.5% on other defense-related investment a factor in U.S. basing decisions, a provision his office credits to him. He voted for the final bill (Roll 320). The FY2027 defense bill the House passed in July 2026 (H.R. 8800), which he also voted for, doesn't contain either provision.

On June 29, 2026, Huizenga introduced the UNLOCK AUKUS Act (H.R. 9517) as lead sponsor, with cosponsors from both parties: Reps. Mark Messmer (R-Ind.), Joe Courtney (D-Conn.), Michael McCaul (R-Texas), Pat Ryan (D-N.Y.), Blake Moore (R-Utah), and Gabe Amo (D-R.I.). Sens. Pete Ricketts (R-Neb.) and Tim Kaine (D-Va.) lead an identical Senate bill, S. 4709, which was placed on the Senate calendar July 27, 2026 (bill status). According to his office, the bill would remove a blanket statutory bar on including Missile Technology Control Regime items in AUKUS collaboration with Australia and the United Kingdom, and would let the president decide which items should still be excluded. It has been referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee and hasn't had a markup or floor vote. It's a data point on his alliance record, not a result yet.